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Summary
You would not use "Red Alert" in association with something about which you did not feel very strongly. Which is precisely why I did use it on two occasions in recent weeks regarding my sense of foreboding about the stock market. On balance, this expression of concern already has shown a modicum of accuracy. It is over the next several weeks, however, that I suspect the current and the prior warnings will earn full justification. If so, investors should be using rallies to increase their cash reserves.
___
Introduction
Paradoxical, perhaps, but it's the stock market's recent rally that have helped to reinforce my bearish inclinations. Last week's overall strength was right on schedule, conforming to patterns that have been developing over the last few months. These are patterns I interpret as distinctly negative in nature and in probable outcome. It could make for a late spring/early summer that is significantly worse than what the market has experienced so far during 2005, which has not been good at all. I currently envision solid double-digit declines for the year to date by sometime this summer.
But I'm getting ahead of myself. In looking forward, I believe it best to summarize what has occurred over the last five months, give or take. Much of this will be in bullet format; please pardon the syntax, as well as some jumping around in chronology and subject material. Much will serve to update the thinking outlined in the two missives referenced above.
___
Onward
Exceptionally Important Housekeeping Chore
I want to reaffirm in the strongest terms my long-term pessimism on stocks. I continue to believe, as I have since 2000, that the equity market is in a secular bear episode, and I continue to suspect it has years yet to run.
* Using the DJIA, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ 100 as proxies, these measures were down 10.8%, 22.7% and 68.4%, respectively, from their 2000 record closes through last Friday's close.
Moreover, I think there is an excellent chance if not probability that the cyclical bull market that commenced during the summer to fall of 2002 is over. If so, this will have been nothing more than a predictable cyclical bull embedded in the secular bear.
* Few people saw the "cyclical bull" coming. I'm happy I did, and for the right reasons, too! (See the missive dated 3/18/03, "Do Stocks Have Life After War?")
Along these same lines, however, I suspect few people will see or acknowledge the cyclical bull's departure until well after the fact.
* Within this context, I'm frequently asked whether I think the final lows for this secular bear already have been made? Frankly, I simply don't know. What I do know is that from current levels, anything that even approximates a retest of the existing lows would be pretty ghastly, and something in which you certainly would not want to participate! Although the lows in the last great secular bear market were made in late 1974, the overall episode still had almost eight years to run. For some guidance here, see Table 3.
A Quick Look at the GRA "Tracking Group"
Mention is made all the time of the GRA seven-measure stock-market "tracking group." This will be the case several times in this missive. This is something I put together years ago, in an attempt to construct a group of bellwether measures that was highly representative of the market, but also possessed some special characteristics. The Russell 2000 and the NASDAQ 100 are examples of the latter.
While I wanted broad representation, I also wanted something manageable in total number. Valid arguments can be made for measures that should be in it that are not, or ones that are in it that perhaps should not be. Nevertheless, it has served its intended purpose very well over the years. In alphabetical order, the group's seven components are: The Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ 100, the NYSE Composite, the Russell 2000, the Standard & Poor's 500, the Value Line (geometric) and the Wilshire 5000.
Employing this proxy, the following table puts the stock market in a 2005 perspective, through last Friday's close.
---------------------------------------------
SELECTED STOCK-MARKET MEASURES
(GRA Seven-Measure "Tracking Group,"
Listed by Year-To-Date Returns)
---------------------------------------------
Thru 04/08
04/08 03/31 12/31 ------------
2005 2005 2004 2005 2005
Close Close Close 1Q YTD
---------------------------------------------
NYSE Comp. 7182 7168 7250 -1.1% -0.9%
S&P 500 1181 1181 1212 -2.6% -2.6%
Wil. 5000 11635 11638 11971 -2.8% -2.8%
DJIA 10461 10504 10783 -2.6% -3.0%
Value Line 385 387 404 -4.2% -4.7%
Russ. 2000 611 615 652 -5.7% -6.3%
NASDAQ 100 1486 1483 1621 -8.5% -8.3%
---------------------------------------------
Average -3.9% -4.1%
Median -2.8% -3.0%
---------------------------------------------
Several additional references are made in this missive to point-to-point returns for this group. The respective values for most of these measuring periods are found in Table 1 in the appendix that follows the text.
Summarizing the Prior "Red Alerts"
Dated 2/21: "Stocks: My Near-Term Outlook Moves to a More Ominous 'Red Alert.'"
In part, this piece opined:
"Based on what I assess as a serious, continuing technical deterioration, I have decided to raise my near-term outlook for the stock market to the status of "Red Alert." My risk/reward assessment of the market from current levels is there is much more of the former than of the latter. Therefore, if you are holding substandard cash reserves to weather the continuation of the secular bear market when it reasserts itself, this appears to be an excellent time to do something about it!
"While you surely don't hear much about them on CNBC and other similar venues, there are fundamental reasons coalescing that should elevate concerns about the equity market. Declining real growth, accelerating inflation, rising interest rates and peaking corporate profits are all on the list. Although the focus of this missive is on technical factors...what is evolving on the technical front may merely reflect the market's traditional role of "looking ahead."
* Between that missive and last Friday, the tracking group registered an average decline of 2.1%. The forecast was off to a decent start!
The 2/21 missive also contained the following, much of it recycled from earlier work. Nevertheless, what follows contains some exceptionally important points that are surely worth repeating, since some of this is now playing out or appears to be getting ready to:
"Past writings have expressed the view that the bad things I thought would happen to stocks last year but didn't merely represented a postponement, not a cancellation, of events. And, on balance, most of the good things that did happen to stocks last year took place in the two months between the Presidential election and year-end. They took place in a rally that possessed the same characteristics of the proverbial three-dollar bill.
"A plethora of hedge-fund managers needed that rally badly to try to get well performance wise. And at the time, overall control of the chessboard remained in the hands of the folks who can 'make' rallies. Thus, the market's bad technical state in October was transformed into a much better one through the end of the year, with a Bush 'relief rally' serving as the excuse.
"Maybe control of what ostensibly is a 'free' market remains in these folks' hands. If so, January's breakdown was nothing more than an aberration. After all, February has seen better times. On the other hand, when you examine how stocks behaved last week during one of those 12 'magical' (euphemism for 'highly manipulative') times a year known as an 'expiration,' perhaps control over the chessboard is passing elsewhere?"
* Through the mid-August 2004 closing lows (last year's lows for all but the DJIA), the tracking group showed an average price-only decline of 6.5%. Respective component declines ran in a range of minus 3.5% for the NYSE Composite, to minus 11.2% for the NASDAQ 100.
* As of the close on 11/2/04 (election day), the tracking group's 2004 year-to-date average return (price only) was a mere +1.6%.
* For all of 2004, the tracking group registered an average price-only return of 10.6%. However, 8.7% of this, or 82% of the entire year's return, came between the close on 11/2 and 12/31/04!
* As history would have it, not only were the Janaury and February expirations lacking in upside gusto, so was the March edition, one that also contained a futures leg. Historically, three consecutive "lackluster" expirations certainly represented a disquieting portent for bulls based on historical perspective.
Then came my piece dated 3/24, "Stocks: 'Red Alert' Reaffirmed!"
In part, it stated:
"Roughly a month ago...I issued a 'Red Alert' on the stock market. Lots of water over the proverbial dam since then, to wit: An immediate, large sell-off, followed by a 'breakout' that wasn't, followed more recently by something that looks to me like a serious, genuine breakdown. Thus, I am taking this opportunity...to reaffirm an outlook that remains at 'Red Alert' status.
"I will also paraphrase a recommendation contained in the 2/21 piece: If you are holding substandard cash reserves to weather the continuation of the secular bear market, do something about it! And I would not tarry, either."
(NOTE: The wording I chose to express the idea that investors without sufficient cash reserves to weather what I thought/think was/is the coming downturn confused some readers. In turn, this gave rise to a missive to clarify the situation, dated 3/28 and entitled, "Stocks: Confusion and Strategy."
* Between the second "Red Alert" missive (3/24) and last Friday, the tracking group advanced an average 0.4%. Certainly nothing very dramatic here, but the period did provide an opportunity to raise cash in a market that was stable, on balance.
* I used the rallies during the period to increase the short position in the GRA model equity portfolio. Per its investment guidelines, the account may hold a maximum short position of 40% of account value. This is where I am heading. As of this writing, the portfolio holds an S&P 500 short position equaling approximately 25% of account value. (The account is short at an average of just under 1198. 2005 activity is broken out in Table 2 of the appendix.)
It's All About Levels!
From a purely technical perspective, the stock market's near- and even longer-term fate is all about some critical levels. And let us not forget that this is an options expiration week, a time when the Wall Street/LaSalle Street axis powers roll out lots of magic tricks that historically, have served to skew markets to the upside. But as earlier material pointed out, this year's first three months have witnessed three not-so-hot events. I certainly would consider four in a row as a major negative.
* As of last Friday, the tracking group stood 4.1%, on average, below the March 2005 closing highs, set on 3/4 and 3/7. Why is this important? Well, as you may recall, the CNBC crowd was declaring "breakout" in early March, because a couple market bellwethers did limp to new highs. But these highs were of the most marginal variety. At least so far, the breakout looks more like a fakeout.
* As of last Friday, the tracking group stood an average 4.3% below the December 2004 closing highs, another decidedly un-bullish fact.
* Again as of last Friday, the tracking group was 4.3%, on average, above respective closes on 11/2/04. At present, the 11/2 numbers are very important, since they represent the inflection point kicking off the post-election Bush "relief rally." In monitoring events going forward, it is absolutely critical to the bullish argument for those levels to hold, if/when tested. As of last Friday, a decline averaging 4.1% was required to return the tracking group to those levels. Component changes needed to accomplish this ran in a range of +0.6% for the NASDAQ 100, to minus 6.7% for the NYSE Composite.
(NOTE: Tables 4 through 6 in the appendix contain data relevant to the market's current technical situation.)
Potpourri
* I believe the current pullback in crude oil is a normal (so far, at least) correction. When it runs its course, I think it will take another shot at the recent highs, with a good chance these highs will be taken out later in the year.
* I realize this runs counter to Alan Greenspan's recent views, to wit:
"Fed chief Alan Greenspan said the current spike in oil prices may not be long-lived. Greenspan noted that futures prices for delivery of oil for summer delivery exceed spot prices. 'That will likely support increased inventories of crude oil. If sustained, these market technicals could encourage enough of an inventory buffer to damp the current price frenzy,' Greenspan said in a speech prepared for delivery Tuesday for the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association."
Remember, though, that in June of 2004, the FOMC (really Greenspan) opined that higher inflation being seen then from high elevated energy prices was "transitory." Crude oil at the time was around $37 per barrel.
* I remain deeply concerned that Federal Reserve policy is being driven by faulty inflation data, etc. Afer all, is the Fed really going to acknowledge that the CPI and PPI as currently calculated are virtually meaningless?
* In this regard, I strongly reccommend that readers acquaint themselves with the fine work of John Williams, who writes a monthly publication entitled, "John Williams' Shadow Government Statistics." For starters, why not read a paper John wrote last September about the foibles of the Consumer Price Index?
* Finally, I mentioned earlier the topic of "peaking corporate profits." We've just commenced a new cycle of reporting for the March quarter, so it is too early to get a handle on how it will come out. Nevertheless have a look at Table 7 and see if you think it reveals anything interesting about earnings deceleration.
Table Appendix
Table 1.
-----------------------------------------------------------
SELECTED STOCK-MARKET MEASURES
(GRA Seven-Measure "Tracking
Group," Listed Alphabetically)
-----------------------------------------------------------
Values on Selected Dates
-----------------------------------------------
04/08 2005 2005 12/31 2004 11/02 12/31
2005 High Low 2004 High 2004 2003
Close Close* Close* Close Close* Close Close
===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== =====
DJIA 10461 10941 10369 10783 10855 10036 10454
NASDAQ 100 1486 1545 1481 1621 1625 1495 1468
NYSE Comp. 7182 7441 6984 7250 7254 6701 6440
Russ. 2000 611 645 605 652 655 585 557
S&P 500 1181 1225 1164 1212 1214 1131 1112
Value Line 385 403 379 404 405 366 363
Wilsh. 5000 11635 12074 11449 11971 11988 11075 10800
-----------------------------------------------------------
*2005 Highs *2005 Lows *2004 Highs
----------- ---------- -----------
DJIA 03/04 01/24 12/28
NASDAQ 100 03/07 do. 12/29
NYSE Comp. 03/04 do. 12/30
Russ. 2000 03/07 do. 12/28
S&P 500 03/07 do. 12/30
Value Line 03/07 do. 12/30
Wilsh. 5000 03/07 do. 12/30
-----------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.
--------------------------------------------------
GRA MODEL EQUITY PORTFOLIO 2005 NON-MONEY MAKRET
ACTIVITY (Account Inception Date = 12/31/04)
--------------------------------------------------
Open Positions
--------------
S&P 500 Equity Market Unit Short Sales
--------------------------------------------------
Contract Gross Net
Date Quant. Price Proceeds Comm. Proceeds
--------------------------------------------------
2005
03/04 SS 82 1220.38 $100,071 $125 $ 99,946
03/30 SS 43 1177.33 $ 50,625 $ 63 $ 50,562
04/01 SS 42 1189.36 $ 49,953 $ 62 $ 49,891
04/07 SS 43 1190.10 $ 51,174 $ 64 $ 51,110
--------------------------------------------------
210 1197.66* $251,823 $314 $251,509
--------------------------------------------------
Memo: S&P 500 close as of 4/8 = 1181.20, result-
ing in approximate unrealized gain as of that
date of $3,147 (including allowance for commis-
sions to close out position.)
--------------------------------------------------
*Average (calculated on net proceeds).
--------------------------------------------------
Closed Positions
----------------
S&P 500 Equity Market Unit (Long Transactions)
--------------------------------------------------
Contract Net Net Gain/
Date Quant. Price Cost Proceeds Loss
--------------------------------------------------
2005
03/29 B 82 1164.48 $95,606 -- --
03/30 S 82 1178.44 $96,511 $905
--------------------------------------------------
Table 3.
--------------------------------------------------
THE DJIA'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE SECULAR
BEAR MARKET OF 12/31/65 THROUGH 08/12/82
--------------------------------------------------
---------- Closing ---------- Year
Year High/Date Low/Date Change Index
--------------------------------------------------
------------
1965 969.26 12/31[1] 840.59 06/28 12/31/65=100.00
------------
1966 995.15 02/09 744.32 10/07 -18.9% 81.06
1967 943.08 09/25 786.41 01/03 +15.2% 93.38
1968 985.21 12/03 825.13 03/21 + 4.3% 97.37
1969 968.85 05/14 769.93 12/17 -15.2% 82.58
1970 842.00 12/29 631.16 05/26 + 4.8% 86.56
1971 950.82 04/28 797.97 11/23 + 6.1% 91.85
1972 1036.27 12/11 889.15 01/26 +14.6% 105.24
-------------
1973 1051.70 01/11[2] 788.31 12/05 -16.6% 87.79
-------------
------------
1974 891.66 03/13 577.60 12/06[3]-27.6% 63.59
------------
1975 881.81 07/15 632.04 01/02 +38.3% 87.95
1976 1014.79 09/21 858.71 01/02 +17.9% 103.66
1977 999.75 01/03 800.85 11/02 -17.3% 85.76
1978 907.74 09/08 742.12 02/28 - 3.2% 83.06
1979 897.61 10/05 796.67 11/07 + 4.2% 86.54
1980 1000.17 11/20 759.13 04/21 +14.9% 99.46
1981 1024.05 04/27 824.01 09/25 - 9.2% 90.28
------------
1982 1070.55 12/27 776.92 08/12[4]+19.6% 107.97
------------
--------------------------------------------------
[1]Beginning of 1965-82 bear market. [2]Closing
high during 1965-82 period. [3]Closing low during
1965-82 period. [4]End of 1965-82 bear market --
total 12/65 to 8/82 price-only return = -19.8%.
--------------------------------------------------
Table 4.
----------------------------------------------------------
DJIA, NASDAQ COMPOSITE AND S&P 500 VERSUS
RESPECTIVE 20-DAY, 50-DAY AND 200-DAY MOVING
AVERAGES (Percent or Portion Thereof)
----------------------------------------------------------
DJIA Vs. NAZ Comp. Vs. S&P 500 Vs.
--------------- --------------- ---------------
Date 20D 50D 200D 20D 50D 200D 20D 50D 200D
----------------------------------------------------------
2005
04/08 -0.7 -1.9 0.8 -0.2 -2.1 0.4 -0.1 -1.2 2.4
04/01 -2.3 -2.4 0.2 -1.9 -2.9 -0.4 -1.5 -1.7 1.8
03/25 -2.7 -2.1 0.6 -2.4 -3.0 -0.1 -2.4 -1.9 1.7
03/18 -1.4 -0.4 2.5 -2.0 -2.5 0.8 -1.2 -0.4 3.5
03/11 -0.3 1.0 3.9 -1.0 -1.3 2.5 -0.6 0.5 4.4
03/04 1.6 2.6 5.7 0.3 -0.4 4.1 1.5 2.3 6.6
02/25 1.2 1.7 4.9 -0.0 -1.1 3.9 1.1 1.4 5.9
02/18 1.4 1.2 4.6 -0.1 -1.8 3.8 0.8 0.7 5.3
02/11 2.1 1.6 4.9 0.9 -1.2 4.9 1.6 1.1 5.8
02/04 1.8 1.1 4.2 1.2 -1.0 5.6 1.8 1.1 5.9
01/28 -1.1 -1.6 1.5 -1.7 -3.6 3.1 -0.8 -1.5 3.2
01/21 -2.3 -2.0 1.2 -3.6 -4.0 3.0 -2.0 -1.8 3.0
01/14 -1.3 -0.3 2.8 -1.8 -1,3 5.8 -1.0 -0.3 4.6
01/07 -1.1 0.5 3.3 -2.6 -0.9 5.9 -1.3 0.1 4.9
2004
12/31 0.9 2.9 5.1 1.1 4.0 10.4 0.9 3.0 7.3
12/24 2.0 4.4 5.7 1.1 4.8 10.1 1.4 3.9 7.4
12/17 0.9 3.3 4.1 0.4 4.5 9.0 0.5 3.1 6.1
12/10 0.2 2.7 3.1 0.8 5.1 8.8 0.3 3.2 5.8
12/03 0.9 3.7 3.6 2.8 7.5 10.0 1.1 4.1 6.1
11/26 1.1 3.4 2.9 2.1 6.4 7.8 1.3 4.0 5.5
11/19 1.8 2.9 2.2 2.3 5.7 6.3 1.5 3.4 4.4
11/12 4.3 4.0 3.0 5.0 7.5 7.0 4.3 5.2 5.7
11/05 3.9 2.7 1.5 4.5 6.3 4.6 4.0 4.1 4.2
10/29 0.4 -0.8 -2.1 1.9 3.8 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1
----------------------------------------------------------
Table 5.
----------------------------------------------------
THE BEHAVIOR OF CBOE SENTIMENT-RELATED MEASURES
AND THE S&P 500 FROM 10/29/04 THROUGH 04/08/05
----------------------------------------------------
CBOE Options S&P 500
Date --------------- -------------------
or Put/Call Ratios Vs. 10/29/04
Week CBOE -------------------- Prior 1130.2 =
Ended VIX* All Equ. Ind. Tot.@ Close Week 100.00
----------------------------------------------------
2005
04/08 12.62 0.93 0.55 1.82 0.86 1181.2 +0.7% 104.51
04/01 14.09 1.06 0.81 1.61 0.86 1172.9 +0.1% 103.78
03/25 13.42 0.78 0.50 2.04 0.88 1171.4 -1.5% 103.65
03/18 13.14 1.27 0.72 2.95 0.88 1189.7 -0.9% 105.26
03/11 12.80 0.99 0.62 1.97 0.88 1200.1 -1.8% 106.18
----------------------------------------------------
03/07#12.26 0.77 0.57 1.38 0.86 1225.3 -- 108.41
----------------------------------------------------
03/04 11.94 0.81 0.61 1.31 0.86 1222.1 0.9% 108.13
02/25 11.49 0.81 0.63 1.32 0.88 1211.4 0.8% 107.18
02/18 11.18 0.86 0.59 1.76 0.88 1201.6 -0.3% 106.32
02/11 11.43 0.86 0.66 1.44 0.88 1205.3 0.2% 106.64
02/04 11.21 0.75 0.49 1.65 0.88 1203.0 2.7% 106.44
01/28 13.24 0.77 0.61 1.19 0.88 1171.4 0.3% 103.65
01/21 14.36 0.87 0.64 1.91 0.87 1167.9 -1.4% 103.34
01/14 12.43 0.72 0.58 1.19 0.89 1184.5 -0.1% 104.80
01/07 13.49 0.97 0.78 1.60 0.89 1186.2 -2.1% 104.95
2004
12/31 12.73 0.66 0.45 1.68 0.88 1211.9 0.1% 107.23
12/24 11.23 0.84 0.57 2.19 0.87 1210.1 1.3% 107.07
12/17 11.95 0.84 0.54 2.10 0.86 1194.2 0.5% 106.66
12/10 12.76 0.63 0.47 1.34 0.88 1188.0 -0.3% 105.11
12/03 12.96 0.74 0.54 1.60 0.88 1191.2 0.7% 105.40
11/26 12.78 0.73 0.58 1.76 0.87 1182.7 1.1% 104.65
11/19 13.50 0.81 0.52 2.53 0.89 1170.3 -1.2% 103.55
11/12 13.33 0.76 0.64 1.15 0.88 1184.2 1.5% 104.78
11/05 13.84 0.69 0.51 1.32 0.88 1166.2 3.2% 103.19
====================================================
10/29 16.27 0.73 0.60 1.32 0.88 1130.2 --> = 100.00
----------------------------------------------------
VIX Highs and Lows (Including Intraday)
---------------------------------------
Year High Date Low Date
---------------------------------------
2005 14.89 03/23 10.90 02/04
2004* 22.67 03/22 11.14 12/23
2003 41.16 03/12 14.83 12/15
2002 56.74 07/24 18.87 03/28
----------------------------------------------------
*New series, all of 2004 forward. @All
products. #High S&P close during period.
----------------------------------------------------
Table 6.
------------------------------------------------
DJIA, S&P 500 AND NASDAQ 100 -- TW0-
WEEK COMPOUND ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE
-- 25 WEEKS ENDED 04/08/05
------------------------------------------------
Week S&P NASDAQ
Ended DJIA 500 100
------------------------------------------------
2005
04/08 5% 24% 32%
04/01 -43% -31% -23%
03/25 -56% -47% -46%
03/18 -53% -50% -62%
03/11 -15% -22% -31%
03/04 45% 55% 9%
02/25 12% 14% -6%
02/18 18% -3% -28%
02/11 147% 110% 70%
02/04 122% 116% 70%
01/28 -28% -25% -65%
01/21 -41% -33% -65%
01/14 -42% -45% -62%
01/07 -42% -41% -55%
2004
12/31 38% 47% 49%
12/24 100% 62% 15%
12/17 15% 7% -51%
12/10 5% 12% 55%
12/03 40% 58% 362%
11/26 -4% -3% 39%
11/19 19% 10% 57%
11/12 265% 236% 240%
11/05 408% 405% 360%
10/29 28% 67% 170%
10/22 -54% -46% 14%
------------------------------------------------
Table 7.
------------------------------------------------
DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE QUARTERLY/
FOUR-QUARTER EARNINGS -- LAST 13 QUARTERS
------------------------------------------------
% Change
--------------------------
Earnings Qtr./ 4-Qtr. 4-Qtr.
($s) Same Qtr. Over Over
Quarter ------------- Prior Prior 4-Qtr.
Ended Qtr. 4-Qtr Year 4-Qtr. Prior Yr.
------------------------------------------------
2005
03/31 <---------- Not Available ---------->
------------------------------------------------
2004
12/31 143.80 592.65 -4.5 -1.1 14.0
09/30 146.15 599.37 20.5 4.3 30.8
06/30 156.37 574.92 21.8 5.0 29.7
03/31 147.33 547.47 23.0 5.3 33.5
2003
12/31 150.52 519.96 69.5 13.5 34.9
09/30 121.26 458.23 13.9 3.3 18.5
06/30 128.36 443.43 34.9 8.1 16.5
03/31 119.82 410.19 25.8 6.4 12.5
2002
12/31 88.79 385.58 -1.4 -0.3 4.3
09/30 106.46 386.81 6.3 1.6 8.0
06/30 95.12 380.54 20.3 4.4 -2.5
03/31 95.21 364.46 -5.0 -1.4 -20.4
------------------------------------------------
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