Summary
Yesterday's attempt at a late-session reversal, albeit an aborted one, may have indicated an approaching end to the stock sell-off -- for now. If so, long Treasuries are probably an excellent sale at around current levels. Meanwhile, last week's firmness in the dollar should be viewed as what it appears to have been -- a bounce from a very oversold level.
_____
Foreword
In early January, "Market Thoughts" replaced "Last Week in the Markets..." The successor publication is very much like the former, but it carries what I think is a more appropriate title. In addition and as the name suggests, the subject material covered is mostly market oriented, at the exclusion of work having a purer economic nature.
_____
Interest Rates
* If there aren't any serious problems in the system, why all the talk about the "flight to quality" that has resulted in the strong rally in longer-dated Treasuries? In early trading yesterday, the yield on the 10-year note fell to 5.00%, maybe even a touch lower, (compared with Friday's close of 5.06%), while the yield on the 30-year bond was down to 5.09% (versus Friday's 5.14%). (See Table 1 in the Table Appendix at the end of the text portion of the missive.)
* The popular wisdom maintains the view that the Fed will pass on another hike in the funds rate at its June policy meeting, a position validated by last week's performance of the fed funds futures market. However, the futures market reflected a slight upward adjustment in its expectations regarding another quarter-point increase as early as the FOMC's August meeting.
Federal Funds Futures
-------------------------------------------------
Fed Funds
Action
05/19 05/12 03/27 FOMC ---------
Contract Yield Yield Yield Meeting To
--------------------------------------------------
Mar. '06 na na 4.59% 3/27-28 25bp 4.75%
Apr. '06 na na 4.77% No Meet. -- --
May '06 4.95% 4.96% 4.89% 5/10 25bp 5.00%
June '06 5.03% 5.03% 4.94% 6/28-29 na na
July '06 5.16% 5.11% 5.00% No Meet. na na
Aug. '06 5.22% 5.17% 5.02% 8/8 na na
Sep. '06 5.25% 5.20% -- 9/20 na na
Oct. '06 5.27% 5.22% -- 10/24 na na
--------------------------------------------------
* Considering the dollar's recent lousy exchange-rate performance, there is no way the Federal Reserve can permit too much ebullience to take hold regarding much in the way of a further decline in open-market interest rates. Therefore, for investors looking to reduce exposure to longer-dated maturities, I suspect sales of both the 10-year and 30-year at around current respective levels will look just fine in the weeks ahead.
The Dollar
* Even a very major world currency (like the dollar) that probably is now in what will prove a protracted, significant downtrend does develop periodic oversold technical conditions. The greenback's recent upward bounce was a reflection of this phenomenon, but a "bounce" is all I think it will prove to be. Using the Dollar Index as the proxy, its more-than-inviting major target is the 80-ish area, the level that launched the rally terminating last autumn with a top of just above 92.
--------------------------------------
U.S. DOLLAR INDEX - 2006 PERFORMANCE
--------------------------------------
Change From
$ Index -------------------
Date Close 03/10/06* 12/31/05
--------------------------------------
2006
05/19 84.88 -6.6% -6.9%
05/12 83.88 -7.7% -8.0%
05/05 85.14 -6.3% -6.6%
04/28 86.10 -5.2% -5.6%
03/31 89.76 -1.2% -1.5%
03/10* 90.84 na -0.4%
02/24 90.56 na -0.7%
01/27 89.31 na -2.0%
======================================
2005
12/31 91.16 na na
--------------------------------------
*2006 end-of-week high.
--------------------------------------
The Stock Market
* The last two weeks have been pretty rugged, particularly considering all the pundits preaching -- and, unfortunately, all the investor believing -- that the equity market's newest paradigm more or less precluded such behavior. Now, at CNBC and other similar places in the regular bullish propaganda loop, it's back to an old mantra, which is: "it's just an overdue, 'healthy' correction." (Is there any other kind in such venues?)
* Through last Friday, employing the DJIA, NDX and S&P 500 as yardsticks, the cumulative results of my strong sell-stocks recommendation of March 20th were as follow:
-------------------------------------
SUMMARY OF GRA STOCK-MARKET SELL
RECOMMENDATION ISSUED ON 03/20/06
-------------------------------------
Change from 03/20/06
As Of ----------------------------
Week NASDAQ S&P
Ended DJIA 100 500 Average
-------------------------------------
2006
05/19 -1.2% -5.1% -3.0% -3.1%
05/12 0.9% -3.0% -1.1% -1.1%
05/05 2.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.9%
04/28 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.7%
04/21 0.6% 1.3% 0.4% 0.8%
04/14 -1.2% 1.5% -1.3% -0.3%
04/07 -1.4% 2.1% -0.8% -0.0%
03/31 -1.5% 1.0% -0.8% -0.4%
------------------------------------
03/20* 11275 1687 1306 --
------------------------------------
*Respective levels at time
of sell recommendation.
------------------------------------
* Before looking ahead, the following table summarizes the recent behavior of the GRA tracking group, through last Friday's close:
----------------------------------------------------------------
SELECTED STOCK-MARKET MEASURES
(GRA Seven-Measure "Tracking
Group," Listed by YTD Returns)
----------------------------------------------------------------
From
05/19 Week Year Most Most Recent
2006 Ended To Recent 2006 Top* Prior Top*
Close 05/19 Date Top Close/Date Close/Date
===== ===== ===== ====== ============ ============
Russ. 2000 723 -2.7% 7.3% -7.5% 782 05/08 782 05/05
NYSE Comp. 8176 -2.8% 5.4% -5.4% 8647 05/09 8623 05/05
DJIA 11144 -2.1% 4.0% -4.3% 11643 05/10 11578 05/05
Value Line (G) 429 -2.5% 4.0% -6.1% 457 05/08 457 05/05
Wilsh. 5000 12812 -2.0% 2.4% -4.8% 13457 05/09 13457 05/05
S&P 500 1267 -1.9% 1.5% -4.4% 1326 05/05 1312 04/05
NASDAQ 100 1601 -2.1% -2.7% -8.9% 1758 01/11 1709 12/02
----------------------------------------------------------------
Average -2.3% 3.1% -5.9%
Median -2.1% 4.0% -5.4%
----------------------------------------------------------------
*Measured using closing prices.
----------------------------------------------------------------
* As the above numbers indicate, the decline has now put some meaningful distance between last week's respective closing prices and each component's 2006 closing highs. This becomes an important technical consideration, discussed in more detail momentarily.
* Something else the recent decline has accomplished is to modify materially the annualized returns of the various tracking group components. A key consideration driving my bearish views this year has been the magnitude of the absolute and annualized stock-market gains. They were simply too high and unsustainable, which factored heavily in the timing of my March sell recommendation.
-----------------------------------------
GRA SEVEN-MEASURE STOCK-MARKET
TRACKING GROUP -- 2006 Y-T-D
RETURNS (Excluding Dividends)
-----------------------------------------
2006 Week Average Median
--------- ------------ ------------
# Ended a b a b
-----------------------------------------
20 05/19 3.1% 8.1% 4.0% 10.4%
19 05/12 5.6% 15.3% 6.2% 17.0%
18 05/05 9.2% 26.6% 8.0% 23.1%
17 04/28 7.5% 22.9% 6.1% 18.7%
16 04/21 7.8% 25.4% 6.3% 20.5%
15 04/14 5.8% 20.1% 4.4% 15.3%
14 04/07 6.3% 23.4% 5.0% 18.6%
13 03/31 6.3% 25.2% 5.1% 20.4%
-----------------------------------------
11* 03/17 6.1% 28.8% 5.3% 25.1%
-----------------------------------------
8 02/24 4.7% 30.6% 3.9% 25.4%
4 01/27 4.4% 57.2% 4.0% 52.0%
-----------------------------------------
a = actual; b = annualized. *End-of-
week closest to GRA stock-market sell
recommendation, issued on 3/20/06.
-----------------------------------------
* Since the above data merely constitute another way of evaluating overbought/oversold conditions, the fast, sharp deceleration evident in the numbers may well be suggesting that the current leg of the market's decline is exhausting itself. (Moreover, considerable effort is being expended by "someone" to hold the S&P 500's 200-day moving average.) However, in expressing these thoughts, I place inordinate emphasis on "current leg." I continue to believe that the 2006 returns for most of the bellwether measures will come in negative!
* It is entirely possible -- even probable -- one of the potential perils of last week's expiration emerged as a negative market force in yesterday's trading. What I have in mind and something mentioned in last week's edition of "Market Thoughts" are large amounts of equity option puts that were exercised over the weekend and that now will be or already have been liquidated.
From last week's "Market Thoughts (#20)," dated 5/15:
"A very short-term consideration about what happens next could revolve around this week's options expiration... Last week's net declines [week ending /12] were sharp enough that were the market to follow through to the downside early this week, there could be some serious 'tilt' in the wrong direction... As just one example of what last week potentially set up, the S&P 500 fell 33.90 points Wednesday through Friday, inclusive [5/10 through 5/12]. In turn, this was equal to 6.78 strike prices on SPX puts.
"The greater danger, though, of an expiration gone bad usually sits over in the world of equity options, where real stock changes hands. I have not done any finite analysis of what evil might be lurking there in the way of puts that have gone or could go into the money. However, my guess is that the potential exposure could be quite meaningful..."
* Already and as you would fully expected, the folks at Certainly Not much Bearish Commentary and other similar places in the regular bullish propaganda loop are out in force, assuring people that all is well. With any additional weakness of import, though, maybe we will even see an appearance by the "Plunge Protection Team"? After all, the Bush Presidency has been in a lot of trouble against the backdrop of a decent stock market. It won't take much of a bad market climate to add to the President's growing problems.
* Referenced earlier was that the decline had now put sizable distance between last week's respective closing prices and each component's 2006 closing highs (using the GRA tracking group as the proxy). As of last Friday, the average decline from the various tops was 5.9%; the median decline was a not dissimilar 5.4%. What this has accomplished for the first time in quite a while is provide sufficient headroom for monitoring possible failing rallies. For this purpose, I will define a failing rally as an upward price movement that fails to take out prior highs, or takes them out very marginally, before a new decline of significance sets in.
* Valid failing rallies recognized as such can lead to conditions that get awfully ugly. This is particularly so in a climate like the current one, in which virtually everyone attempts to employ some level of technical-analysis judgments in their investment/trading activities. What you look for after the failing rally has set in is the ability to make "lower lows" -- levels that would comfortably exceed possible double-bottoms.
* Since we don't know when the down-leg will conclude -- at present, I personally think it could be very soon, at least in time -- failing rallies and lower lows remain posibilities for the future. Or who knows, maybe not at all, at least not in the immediate future. Nevertheless, given what has occurred over the last couple weeks, give or take, it is not too early to think about possible developments and outcomes.
* For what it may (or may not) be worth, at its high yesterday, the CBOE Volatility Index traded at 19.62. This was a new 2006 high by a comfortable margin, eclipsing Friday's then-high of 18.01. The 2005 VIX high was 18.59, so it also was violated yesterday. For those who have been coveting increased volatility, you're getting it. For those placing major trading bets against increased volatility, you are getting something, too!
* I expect Thursday's release of revised first-quarter gross domestic product data to be the cause celebre for attempting to get investors into a better mood. There is likely to be a significant upward revision to the showcase number that was released on 4/28.
* In its initial report, the Commerce Department estimated first-quarter real growth at 4.8%, versus a 1.7% result for last year's December quarter. Thursday's revision should push the first-quarter 2006 number well into the 5s, even the high 5s. However, much of this is likely to come from a sizable downward revision in the trade deficit, something I think is, well, ah, let's say, "suspicious" (and "specious" will work, too!). More on the pending GDP revision in a separate missive...
(NOTE: Tables 2-5 in the Appendix break out additional data I often use, updated through last Friday (5/19). The next edition of "Market Thoughts" will examine some areas not addressed in this edition, gold and crude oil in particular. On the former, I remain as constructive as ever, and over the longer run, the current correction in bullion should prove highly beneficial.
As to oil, the official approach of hurricane season (June 1st) by itself virtually assures a continued very high level of volatility. Each storm entering the Gulf of Mexico, or looking like it might, will provide ample evidence of what I'm talking about.)
* Mention a moment ago of the "Plunge Protection Team" reminds me of how vociferous many in the financial "media" are in arguing that no such entity exists. Their contention is that it merely is a concoction of us conspiracy people. Of course, this is the portion of the financial media that incessantly shills for Wall Street.
* In a free-market economy, the very thought of something dubbed the "Plunge Protection Team" is nothing short of revolting! This is especially so when you think about all the arrogant Beltway folks who constantly preach about the virtues of "free" markets to people who oversee governments with markets that admittedly are less than free. (At least the latter are often honest about it!) Imagine, for instance, how amused someone like Vladimir Putin must be when being preached to on such matters, while his host peers deeply into his eyes, assessing Putin's soul. (I wonder if "Puty" packs an extra change of Depends for such occasions?)
* At any rate, regarding the Plunge Protection Team, I am going to dust off some fine work on the subject done last November by colleague, John Williams. It was contained in a special supplement to the November edition of John's "Shadow Government Statistics."
This supplement was inspired by the Fed's decision last November to take M3 away from us, ostensibly for reasons of economy. (Speaking of needing an extra change of Depends!) I'll excerpt some of the content, but if you did not read the entire work then, you should now. The link appears later.
From John's work from of November:
"Unilaterally and without reasonable explanation, the Fed has decided to stop reporting money supply M3, the broadest of the monetary aggregates and probably the most important statistic published by the U.S. central bank... One obvious explanation that makes sense is that the Fed does not want anyone to see what Presumptive Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is going to do to broad money growth.
"...Something is terribly afoul at the Fed, but the popular financial press offers little but moronic platitudes and attacks on 'conspiracy theorists' who dare to question the sanctity of the Federal Reserve Board.
"I even saw one related comment yesterday from a well known financial reporter who laughed at the concept of there being a Plunge Protection Team that intervenes in troubled stock markets. She cited such a concept as evidence of the absurdity of some conspiracy theories.
"I first saw the term "Plunge Protection Team" used in 1997 by the Washington Post, when it published an extensive article detailing the activities of the 'Working Group on Financial Markets'... It was authored by Post staff writer, Brett D. Fromson, and it appeared on Sunday, February 23, 1997.
[(A link to the Post article appears in the text of John's article, "JWSGS - November 2005 Edition, M3 Supplement."]
"And for what it's worth, my colleague, Doug Gillespie, published a piece on his website on November 14th entitled, "Bye-Bye, M3, but Why?"
"There was an outpouring of reader response to Doug's article, and to a person, respondents expressed the opinion that the Fed's action failed -- and failed badly -- the smell test."
______________
Table Appendix
Table 1.
-------------------------------------------------
TREASURY YIELD CURVE AS OF 05/19/06
-------------------------------------------------
90-Day 2-Yr. 5-Yr. 10-Yr. 30-Yr.
Date Bill* Note Note Note Bond
-------------------------------------------------
05/19/06 4.81% 4.96% 4.96% 5.06% 5.14%
05/12/06 4.82% 5.00% 5.03% 5.19% 5.30%
12/31/05 4.08% 4.40% 4.35% 4.39% 4.54%
-------------------------------------------------
BASIS-POINT CHANGE TO 05/19/06 FROM:
-------------------------------------------------
05/12/06 -1 -4 -7 -13 -16
12/31/05 73 56 61 67 60
-------------------------------------------------
YIELD-SPREAD DIFFERENTIALS
-------------------------------------------------
90D-> 02Y-> 05Y-> 10Y-> 90D->
02Y 05Y 10Y 30Y 30Y
---------------------------------
05/19/06 15 0 10 8 33
05/12/06 18 3 16 11 48
12/31/05 32 -5 4 15 46
-------------------------------------------------
*Coupon-equivalent yield.
-------------------------------------------------
Table 2.
--------------------------------------
DJIA, S&P 500 AND NASDAQ 100 -- TW0-
WEEK COMPOUND ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE
-- 21 WEEKS ENDED 05/19/06
--------------------------------------
Week S&P NASDAQ
Ended DJIA 500 100
--------------------------------------
2006
05/19 -63% -69% -83%
05/12 3% -32% -64%
05/05 69% 33% 8%
04/28 70% 54% -16%
04/21 69% 37% 19%
04/14 7% -11% 14%
04/07 -31% -14% 94%
03/31 -33% -22% 32%
03/24 61% 54% 64%
03/17 83% 49% 2%
03/10 3% -15% -36%
03/03 -20% -0% 15%
02/24 40% 58% 22%
02/17 115% 60% 18%
02/10 3% -29% -52%
02/03 36% 5% -17%
01/27 -12% -8% -42%
01/20 -50% -39% -59%
01/13 79% 124% 375%
01/06 18% 41% 121%
2005
12/30 -32% -33% -49%
--------------------------------------
Table 3.
----------------------------------------------------------
DJIA, NASDAQ COMPOSITE AND S&P 500 CLOSING PRICES ON
SELECTED DATES VERSUS RESPECTIVE 20-DAY, 50-DAY AND
200-DAY MOVING AVERAGES (Percent or Portion Thereof)
----------------------------------------------------------
DJIA Vs. NAZ Comp. Vs. S&P 500 Vs.
--------------- --------------- ---------------
Date 20D 50D 200D 20D 50D 200D 20D 50D 200D
----------------------------------------------------------
2006
05/19 -2.2 -1.2 2.8 -4.2 -5.0 -1.6 -2.8 -2.6 0.7
05/12 -0.1 1.1 5.2 -3.5 -3.1 0.7 -1.5 -0.8 2.7
05/05 2.5 3.3 7.1 0.6 1.1 5.2 1.6 2.1 5.6
04/28 1.2 1.8 5.4 -0.7 0.4 4.5 0.7 1.2 4.6
04/21 1.4 1.9 5.4 0.3 1.6 5.5 0.8 1.4 4.8
04/14 -0.5 0.4 3.6 0.0 1.3 5.1 -0.8 0.0 3.2
04/07 -0.8 0.4 3.6 0.9 1.9 5.9 -0.4 0.6 3.8
03/31 -0.5 0.7 3.7 1.8 2.3 6.3 0.1 0.9 4.0
03/24 1.4 2.6 5.5 0.9 1.3 5.4 0.9 1.6 4.9
03/17 1.8 2.9 5.7 0.9 0.9 5.5 1.5 2.0 5.6
03/10 0.3 1.3 3.9 -0.8 -0.1 3.6 -0.1 0.3 3.6
03/03 0.2 1.0 3.5 1.1 1.1 5.7 0.6 0.9 4.2
02/24 1.0 1.6 4.2 0.5 0.7 5.6 0.9 1.3 4.7
02/17 2.2 2.2 4.7 0.4 0.6 5.3 1.2 1.2 4.5
02/10 0.9 0.7 3.0 -0.6 -0.2 4.8 -0.4 -0.2 3.2
02/03 -0.7 -0.6 2.1 -1.4 -0.1 5.6 -1.2 -0.4 3.4
01/27 0.4 0.6 3.4 1.0 2.0 8.0 0.6 1.4 5.3
01/20 -1.9 -1.5 1.2 -1.1 -0.1 5.6 -1.0 0.0 3.6
01/13 0.7 1.3 4.0 2.3 3.2 9.0 1.3 2.3 5.9
01/06 1.2 2.0 4.2 2.6 4.0 9.1 1.6 3.0 6.0
==========================================================
2005
12/30 -1.0 0.1 1.9 -1.7 -0.2 4.5 -1.1 0.4 3.1
----------------------------------------------------------
Table 4.
------------------------------------------------------
THE BEHAVIOR OF CBOE SENTIMENT-RELATED MEASURES
AND THE S&P 500 FROM 10/29/04 THROUGH 05/19/06
------------------------------------------------------
CBOE Options S&P 500
Date --------------- --------------------
or Put/Call Ratios Vs. 10/29/04
Week CBOE -------------------- Prior 1130.2 =
Ended VIX* All Equ. Ind. Tot.@ Close Week 100.00
------------------------------------------------------
2006
05/19 17.18 1.27 0.75 1.95 0.82 1267.0 -1.9% 112.10
05/12 14.19 1.27 0.72 2.10 0.83 1291.2 -2.6% 114.25
------------------------------------------------------
05/05H 11.62 0.82 0.46 1.72 0.83 1325.8 1.2% 117.31
------------------------------------------------------
04/28 11.59 0.87 0.62 1.69 0.83 1310.6 -0.1% 115.96
04/21 11.59 0.93 0.60 1.65 0.83 1311.3 1.7% 116.02
04/14 12.38 0.86 0.60 1.45 0.83 1289.1 -0.5% 114.06
04/07 12.26 0.91 0.58 1.83 0.83 1295.5 0.1% 114.63
03/31 11.39 0.83 0.61 1.68 0.82 1294.8 -0.6% 114.56
03/24 11.19 0.84 0.63 1.55 0.82 1303.0 -0.3% 115.29
03/17 12.12 0.79 0.61 1.05 0.83 1307.3 2.0% 115.67
03/10 11.85 0.87 0.53 2.02 0.81 1281.6 -0.4% 113.40
03/03 11.96 0.87 0.66 1.41 0.82 1287.2 -0.2% 113.89
02/24 11.46 0.93 0.64 2.07 0.82 1289.4 0.2% 114.09
02/17 12.01 0.83 0.51 1.36 0.81 1287.2 1.6% 113.89
02/10 12.87 0.68 0.86 0.57 0.82 1267.0 0.2% 112.10
02/03 12.96 1.08 0.70 2.50 0.83 1264.0 -1.5% 111.84
01/27 11.97 0.80 0.59 1.45 0.84 1283.7 1.8% 113.58
01/20 14.56 1.08 0.69 1.91 0.88 1261.5 -2.0% 111.62
01/13 11.23 0.78 0.59 1.64 0.87 1287.6 0.2% 113.93
01/06 11.00 0.68 0.58 0.87 0.86 1285.5 3.0% 113.74
=====================================================
2005
12/30 12.07 0.80 0.50 1.39 0.86 1248.3 -1.6% 110.45
------------------------------------------------------
VIX Highs and Lows (Including Intraday)
---------------------------------------
Year/
Week High Date Low Date
---------------------------------------
2006 18.01 05/19 10.53 03/14
-------------------------------
05/19 18.01 05/19 12.98 05/16
=======================================
2005 18.59 04/18 9.88 07/20
2004* 22.67 03/22 11.14 12/23
2003 41.16 03/12 14.83 12/15
2002 56.74 07/24 18.87 03/28
------------------------------------------------------
*New series, all of 2004 forward. @All
products. L-Lowest S&P close during 2005.
H-Highest S&P close during entire period.
------------------------------------------------------
Table 5.
-------------------------------------------------------------
SELECTED NYSE BREADTH MEASURES --
WEEKLY & CUMULATIVE DATA (10/29/04=0)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Average Net
Adv-Dec UVol-DVol 52W H-L Closing Tick
----------- ---------- ---------- -----------------
Week Vs.
Ended Week Cum Week Cum Week Cum Week Cum Prior
-------------------------------------------------------------
2006
05/19 -2722 41561 -2.39 17.45 -659 44219 135 37025 1.004
05/12 -4216 44283 -2.48 19.84 539 44878 490 36890 1.013
05/05 2481 48499 1.40 22.32 908 44339 310 36400 1.009
04/28 -387 46018 -0.25 20.92 312 43431 396 36090 1.011
04/21 2358 46405 2.06 21.17 727 43119 650 35694 1.019
04/14*-2142 44047 -0.79 19.11 -231 42392 372 35044 1.011
04/07 -1328 46189 0.23 19.90 857 42623 522 34672 1.015
03/31 -119 47517 -0.28 19.67 773 41766 481 34150 1.014
03/24 -53 47636 0.12 19.95 609 40993 293 33669 1.009
03/17 4479 47689 2.41 19.83 1141 40384 676 33376 1.021
03/10 -1753 43210 -0.90 17.42 223 39243 382 32700 1.012
03/03 -256 44963 -0.31 18.32 802 39020 388 32318 1.012
02/24* 1199 45219 0.20 18.63 886 38218 606 31930 1.019
02/17 2965 44020 1.85 18.43 689 37332 514 31324 1.017
02/10 243 41055 -0.27 16.58 375 36643 440 30810 1.015
02/03 -1503 40812 -1.32 16.85 977 36268 502 30370 1.107
01/27 3805 42315 2.20 18.17 1243 35291 715 29868 1.025
01/20*-1204 38510 -1.51 15.97 599 34048 405 29153 1.014
01/13 1308 39714 0.16 17.48 1209 33449 586 28748 1.021
01/06* 5195 38406 2.99 17.32 992 32240 518 28162 1.019
=============================================================
2005
12/30* -978 33211 -1.05 14.33 -2 31248 313 27644 1.011
-------------------------------------------------------------
*Four-day trading week.
-------------------------------------------------------------
|
